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The Theory of the Individual in Economics by John B. Davis provides a rich synthesis of a 
vast literature in economics, sociology and philosophy and displays an impressive 
perspective, encompassing essential issues in the social sciences. It is rare to read such a 
well-informed book that covers such a broad spectrum. Nevertheless, I strongly disagree 
with what I take as the main idea of the book, that is the idea of the limits of methodological 
individualism (MI) (even more than the limits of orthodox economics) and therefore the 
necessity of adopting methodological holism (MH) (even more than heterodox economics). I 
will briefly discuss the conception of the debate between the two paradigms and contest the 
idea that MI has reached a stalemate, which Davis suggests in various ways and which ought 
to lead to a paradigm “shift” (as in Kuhn’s model). I do not contest that it is probably a 
priori possible to construct a social science (including economics) taking MH as its point of 
departure, which, however, I define differently than Davis, although I am sceptical of the 
aptitude of MH to compete with MI, given the strong development of economics (and social 
sciences) within the MI framework. But I will only make a defence of MI itself here – which 
I also define a little differently than John Davis – and of its aptitude to widen its scope in 
order to offer a more realistic idea of individuals in economic and social life. 
 
John B. Davis opposes “the two main conceptions of the individual in economics – the 
familiar orthodox conception associated with neoclassical and mainstream economics and a 
less sharply articulated conception associated with dissident traditions in heterodox 
economics” (p. 2). Actually, the two conceptions at issue do not only apply to economics but 
to sociology as well. This is obvious when Davis introduces the heterodox conceptions since 
the main leading figures of this tradition he quotes are Marx and Durkheim themselves (6.1, 
pp. 109-111) and the main contemporary leading figure in the same tradition is the 
sociologist Anthony Giddens, whose structure-agency model plays a major role in Davis’s 
book (6.2, pp. 111-114). 
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The fundamental characterization of orthodox and heterodox traditions is set out by John 
Davis as an issue of an opposite valuation of individuals in economic life: “Orthodox 
economics, which of course places great weight on individuals in economics, generally treats 
individuals as relatively autonomous or even atomistic beings [...]. Heterodox economics, 
which places considerably less weight on individuals, generally regards individuals as being 
embedded in social and economic relationships” (p. 16). If one speaks in terms of traditions 
and from an external point of view to these traditions, one cannot say that it is wrong. From 
this point of view, it is easy to place Menger or Walras (and also Weber in sociology),1 for 
example, in the first category and Marx and Durkheim in the second. But this overlooks why 
these authors give such an impression. Davis adds, “The differences between the two main 
approaches reflect their opposed attachments to two long-established, competing 
methodological traditions in economics, namely, methodological individualism and 
methodological holism” (p.17). Of course, it is possible to speak of traditions here as well, 
although it would be more exact not to limit them to economics since they are also illustrated 
in sociology and anthropology, and holism is even more in the latter domains than in the 
former. But it is regrettable to make no distinction between historical traditions – in which 
different and more or less vague methodological principles can be linked together for various 
contingent reasons – and sets of methodological principles, which can be carefully selected 
and defined, reformulated or abandoned, exchanged with others and so on, so that their 
choice can be set out as necessary. Some principles of this set of methodological principles 
can even be borrowed from traditions other than the traditions where the main principles 
come from. Actually, Davis himself makes such a use of individualistic tradition to enlarge 
methodological holism. (I will give some examples below). 
 
I can agree with Davis on the point that the ways methodological individualism is often 
formulated lacks rigour. For example, when Elster writes that MI is a “doctrine” (p. 36), he 
seems to forget that it is just a method. It is also true that current MI is closer to what 
Schumpeter called sociological individualism than to MI as Schumpeter defined it,2 
especially when it is confused with this doctrinal individualism. To the extent that MI is 
acceptable, it needs to be defined as a perspective that requires in order to explain the social 
phenomena always coming back to the individuals that are at their source. But such a 
programme does not exclude other issues, for example, describing how individuals are 
constrained by those social facts themselves. One can find examples of very classical figures 
who clearly upheld such a variety of MI, for example Simmel. Simmel’s work did not deal 
only with sociology but also with socio-economics, as is obvious in The Philosophy of 
Money. And this work is invoked by many socio-economists.3 But Davis never quotes it. 
 
                                            
1 Weber is never quoted in the book. As will be noted other times, Davis only mentions one tradition 
in sociology. 
2 Davis recalls (pp. 35-36) that Schumpeter considered MI as the kind of investigation that deals with 
the “behavior of individuals without going into the factors that formed this behavior” (Schumpeter, 
1954, p. 889), while he called “sociological individualism” the idea that “all social phenomena resolve 
themselves into decisions and actions of individuals that need not or cannot be further analyzed in 
terms of supraindividual factors” (p. 888). 
3 For example by economists upholding “the French conventions theory” (cf. infra), like A. Orléan or 
M. Aglietta. 
Comments on John B. Davis,  
The Theory of the Individual in Economics. Identity and Value 
Éthique et économique/Ethics and Economics, 3 (1) 2005, 
http://ethique-economique.org/ 
3 
One has to add here that, contrary to what Davis suggests, MI is not necessarily linked to an 
individualist ontology. Again, MI is just a rule of method which does not exclude in itself 
that one accepts the existence of collective entities, as soon as one can show that these 
entities emerge from the individual entities. Besides, “emergence” can have two different 
meanings. When Hayek speaks of emergence, he is just making allusion to the fact that there 
may be a kind of order even in social phenomena that were not planned or expected. The 
market “emerges” in this sense. But it has no existence in itself. For Hayek and many other 
MI theoreticians (like Menger or Weber), “market” is just a word.4 But it is also possible to 
think of certain institutions as having a proper being, although in a specific sense of 
“existence”, especially if they are supposed to have a specific causal power.5 Popper is a 
good historical example of such a methodological individualism upholding an ontological 
holism or “collectivism” (or realism of collective entities).6 Actually, most methodological 
individualists support ontological individualism (OI) (Friedrich Hayek, James Coleman, and 
Jon Elster), but it is for reasons independent of MI principles themselves. They assume the 
principle of parsimony in ontology and they do so, for example, because they choose to 
accept only that which has empirical evidence (as individuals do). But logically speaking, OI 
is not involved in MI. 
 
Another confusion that is often made about IM – a confusion that Davis seems to assume - is 
that MI only or mainly deals with the role of individuals in economics and social 
phenomena. But actually, as I have already suggested above, nothing should prevent the 
social scientist working within the MI framework from also taking into account the causal 
role of market, institutions, culture, etc. upon individuals (whatever he really thinks – besides 
– of the possible sui generis existence or “subsistence”7 of these institutions, culture, etc.). 
Again, the methodological rule requires only that this market, these institutions, and this 
culture be explained through the actions and beliefs of individuals, as far as data are 
available for such an explanation. Simmel again follows such a rule and institutionalist 
individualists as well (Agassi). Some methodological individualists, like Bourricaud, one of 
the French translators and commentators of Parsons in French, explicitly even took 
advantage of the holistic tradition, reconstructing Parsons in an individualistic way.8 
Consequently, there is no reason to consider (like Davis) that Arrow upheld a “moderate 
holism” just because he treated “the institutions of the market as a framework within which 
individual action occurs” (p. 34). Consequently also, the idea of a structure-agent model in 
which the structure is seen as the result of the actions of individuals and individuals as 
constrained and even forged by the structure is not at all new in itself. Besides, Giddens’ 
formulation lacks analyticity saying that structure and agency are “inseparable” (p. 112).  
                                            
4 Cf. Davis, who rightly says that “Hayek maybe the most clear in maintaining that supraindividual 
entities are merely concepts rather than real things” (p. 34). 
5 “Existence” can be said in many senses, so that assuming the existence of collective entities does not 
involve assuming the idea that they exist in the same sense of empirical entities. An Austrian 
philosopher, Meinong, suggested making a distinction in such cases between “existence” (which 
means existence in the proper sense) and “subsistence”. 
6 Popper made a comparison of the acceptance of beings like mathematical figures or numbers and 
categorises all of them in a specific “third” World. 
7 See note 5. 
8 Bourricaud, F., L’individualisme institutionnel de Talcott Parsons, PUF, Paris, 1977. 
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It is true that from an external point of view, the global impression will probably be that the 
MI explanation places greater weight on individuals compared to MH, but it is essentially for 
both the following reasons. On the one hand, MI always urges social scientists to find the 
individual source of social phenomena even if, in a given context, the issue is to know the 
constraints of institutions above the individuals. On the other hand, standard MH in itself 
does not require any analysis of the role of individuals, although nothing prevents social 
scientists who use MH from also examining the role of individuals in the emergence of 
institutions. The kind of MH that Davis constructs, which is focused on individuals much 
more than usual in this paradigm, is precisely a brilliant example of this way of working in 
social sciences. 
 
But actually what is methodological holism? Davis quotes a very interesting definition from 
Durkheim: “The group thinks, feels, acts quite differently from the way in which its 
members would were they isolated. If, then, we begin with the individual, we shall be able to 
understand nothing of what takes place in the group” (Durkheim, 1938, p. 103) (p. 110) and 
Davis comments, “a scientific sociology needs to concern itself with social phenomena 
external to individuals” (p. 110). Rather oddly, Davis does not say anything about the fact 
that this definition is extremely bold. How can we contend – if not just metaphorically – that 
a group “thinks, feels, and acts”? I contend that this kind of holism (a variety of ontological 
holism) has not got any scientific significance at all and that, for this reason, it cannot surely 
be the basis of an alternative paradigm to MI. Even if one accepts that market, institutions, 
and culture exist (or “subsist”) by themselves, even if we think that groups exist on their 
own, it cannot be in the sense individual bodies live. Groups do not have a brain or entrails. 
So that if groups exist, they cannot be said to think, feel or act as individual humans do. 
What is clearly understandable in these matters is first that the social scientist has to take into 
account the beliefs and feelings of individuals he is studying and of the fact that many people 
(and maybe all people) sometimes spontaneously have the impression that the nation, the 
State, the crowd, the family, or even the market and the economic system, exist by 
themselves and that this feeling makes them act in a very different way than the way they act 
when they do not feel they are in such groups.9 What is also understandable, and maybe 
relevant, is to choose to take these beliefs as a starting point for the social sciences (including 
economics). It would characterise a clear kind of MH. 
 
MI takes its departure in a very abstract conception of individuals. However this choice is 
not linked to MI itself but to an epistemological conception of science that urges using the 
method of “decreasing abstraction”10, which is used in physics, for example (just think of 
Galileo). The standard way in sciences is to begin with abstract (and thus poor) models, 
remote from effective reality, and to constantly enrich the models, although without 
expecting, however, to compete with a phenomenological description of reality (such as 
                                            
9 Popper assumes the existence of such entities (cf. supra), but not in an anthropomorphic manner as 
Durkheim does. Nevertheless, I confess that I do not clearly understand the advantages of such an 
assumption. 
10 Lindenberg, S., “The method of decreasing abstraction” in J. Coleman and T. Fararo (eds.), 
Rational Choice Theory. Advocacy and critique, Sage Publications, Newbury Park, 1992, pp. 3-20. 
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history gives on social matters). For example, one can add norms and rules as normative 
constraints – which limit the acts of the individuals – to the idea of an atomistic individual 
seeking his self-interest (Hayek, Coleman, and Hechter). One can also add individuals’ 
beliefs, and especially beliefs in collective entities, with the modifications of the behaviour 
such beliefs involve. One can add infra-individual considerations as Davis demonstrates that 
some authors already have. However, this conception is still too abstract and too far from 
real individuals. But Davis himself says that authors like Elster, Davidson, and Becker, each 
of whom everyone committed to MI in the social sciences, suggested in at least two ways 
how to go further within this paradigm (p. 80). Davis speaks of “two new threads that might 
be pursued in search of an alternative account of individual”. However, how can pursuing 
something be using an alternative way? Why does Davis in the rest of his book interpret 
what appears as continuity here as discontinuity, motivating a shift from a paradigm to 
another? One can make symmetric comments on the use of Sen by Davis (pp. 150-166). 
Why does he present Sen as giving new impulse to heterodox economic and methodological 
holism while it is clear that Sen only wants to open up orthodox economics?11 One could 
have similar reservations about the French “Intersubjectivist” School (p.125), since its 
leading figure characterises their perspective as “un individualisme méthodologique 
élargi.”12 
 
The place Davis gives to the conceptions of collective intentionality deserves special 
consideration since Davis says it is his major contribution in this book. Davis is probably 
right to think that Tuomela’s and Gilbert’s works should reach an important place in 
contemporary economics (and even social sciences).13 But again, it is problematic to 
consider that they are open towards heterodox economics, grounded on an alternative 
paradigm since their departure is clearly individualistic. Moreover, Tuomela does all he can 
for not adopting ontological holism and refusing even the Gilbertian idea of a plural subject, 
closer to Durkheim. As Davis says, Tuomela reduces collective intentions to the we-
intentions of individuals. But the reason why Davis is interested in collective intentionality 
analysis is paradoxical14 and gives birth to embarrassed formulations. Thus, saying that 
“social relationships are embedded in individuals” (p. 130) – which is what collective 
intentionality analysis tries to show – is not saying that individuals are embedded in social 
relations, which is the point Davis upholds (cf. chapter 6: “The embedded individual”, 
pp. 107-129). Besides, when Tuomela made some allusion to Giddens, it is true that he found 
                                            
11 One of Sen’s main points is to go back to Adam Smith and Smithian double conception of 
motivations : not only self-interest (or self-love) but sympathy as well. It is not to leave MI at all (at 
least if MI is not reduced to the supposition of the individuals as rational) neither to become 
Durkheimian. See Sen, A., On Ethics and Economics, Blackwell, Oxford, 1991. 
12 André Orléan, “Introduction” in A. Orléan (ed.) Analyse économique des conventions, PUF, Paris, 
1994, pp. 13, 15. 
13 One could add Pettit, P. “Groups with minds of their own” in Frederick Schmitt (ed.), Socializing 
Metaphysics, Rowman & Littlefield, London, 2003. 
14 Davis writes himself, “It may seem odd [...] to propose that a discussion of socially embedded 
individuals begin with an account of individual behavior”(p. 130) 
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this author more interesting for his own purpose than most other sociologists.15 But it is 
through taking very clear individualist bases. Both Tuomela and Gilbert are close to Simmel 
again in their endeavours to construct collective intentionality from an individualistic basis 
(and Gilbert explicitly acknowledges her debt to Simmel). 
 
It is less strange that Davis reinforces the opposition between MI and MH by reinterpreting 
the debate about the relevance of cognitive studies within a debate about the relevance of the 
Wittgensteinian views on the philosophy of mind. In fact, from Peter Winch, Wittgenstein’s 
philosophy has often been used for a revival of a certain kind of holism in social sciences. 
Actually, what is at stake in this supposed holism is still the role of external constraints and 
especially of social rules on individuals’ actions. But again MI can assume the role of such 
external constraints and social rules. Wittgensteinian philosophers often show how 
frequently confused and naive the ideas of cognitivists are about the mind and how fallacious 
the words they use are. But it ought not to lead to condemning all the cognitive studies in 
themselves, which Wittgensteinians very often do.16 Besides, Davis rejects cognitive studies 
in economics on the basis they would give a computational conception of the mind. But this 
is surely not the case of the most famous psychologists in this domain, Tversky and 
Kahneman (who are not quoted), who just want to know cognitive processus without 
supposing that the mind necessary works like a computer.17 In the same sense, one can study 
some mechanical processes without contending that they explain the entire individual (who 
also obey rules and norms) and that the historical traditions are not at issue to understand 
social and economic processes. But the methodological rule will be – as above18 – to go from 
the general and abstract models to the more singular and concrete. 
  
                                            
15 Tuomela, R., The Philosophy of Social Practices, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002, 
p. 78, and especially p. 263, where he wrote, “Our model serves to make precise and also improves on 
the central aspects of Giddens’s structuration theory”. 
16 For example, experimental psychology on logical biases, on memory, attention, etc. are not as 
directly affected by Wittgensteinian critics as Fodor’s conceptions. 
17 John Davis mainly considers Herbert Simon’s work on artificial intelligence. 
18 See Lindenberg and the method of decreasing abstraction (n. 10). 
